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  In Minnesota, the law is CHAPTER 105-H.F.No. 984;  An act relating to cooperatives;
1
authorizing businesses to organize as cooperative associations; providing penalties; amending Minnesota
Statutes 2002, sections 80A.14, subdivision 17; 80A.15, subdivision 2; 322B.70, subdivision 1;
proposing coding for new law in Minnesota Statutes, chapter 322B; proposing coding for new law as
Minnesota Statutes, chapter 308B.  Wyoming was the first to enact such a statute.   The National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCLUSA) created a Study Committee on a
Business Cooperative Act to address the possibility of developing a new cooperative law for State
consideration.  After meetings and discussions, the Reporter prepared a draft for the annual NCCLUSL
meeting July 30 - August 6, 2004.  By that time the effort had narrowed to agricultural and agricultural
related cooperatives in a current proposal entitled “Agricultural and Agricultural Related Cooperatives
Act.”
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“Outside” Cooperative Equity: 
Obligations, Tradeoffs, and Fundamental Cooperative Character





Three forces have converged in the last quarter century to cause significant rethinking
about “traditional” cooperative finance.  The first has been the realization that participation in
value-added activities by cooperatives on behalf of their farmer members can or must supplant a
defensive devotion to commodity marketing.  The second force, growing from the first, has been
new demand for large amounts of capital, capital that is either beyond the means of farmer
patrons to provide or available only at a cost to farmers exceeding the returns expected from their
use of the cooperative.  The third force has been farmers’ changing views of cooperative
capitalization as evidenced by their demands for measurable return on capital and for liquidity.
The consequences have been relatively new efforts by some cooperatives to obtain
“outside” equity capital.  Though very limited at present, this activity has led to a much broader
consideration of cooperative fundamentals because cooperative incorporation statutes are viewed
by some as “impediments” to such equity plans.  Actions by a relative few have carried the issue
into arenas that may have significant impacts on the cooperative form of business not only for
farmer cooperatives but for those creating, using, promoting, and supporting cooperatives in all
sectors of the economy.  The prime example, discussed at this Conference, is a revision of
cooperative incorporation statutes that have typically reflected a generally understood concept of
what cooperatives are and how they focus on the economic returns to their users.   Given that
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cooperative statutes do reflect principles with which “outside equity” seems to be at odds,
statutes may indeed pose challenges to such equity plans.  The general approach follows a stepwise process for research on cooperatives outlined by the
2
author at the American Agricultural Economics Association conference in Denver, Colorado, August 3,
2004, in a presentation “Corporate Essentials and the Cooperative Firm.”
-2-
Issues Raised
Outside equity yields three views of cooperative finance that are at odds with traditional
cooperative principles.  The principle that cooperatives are financed by those who use them is
challenged when equity capital can be invested by those who do not patronize the cooperative. 
The principle that the benefits of a cooperative are devoted to and distributed to those who use
the cooperative in proportion to use is challenged by the assertion that investors in a cooperative
demand compensation solely for their investment.  The latter view also suggests that the value of
the equity can be realized by equity transfers in market-driven transactions.  The principle that
cooperatives are controlled by those who use them is challenged by the explicit or implicit
participation in cooperative control by those whose only relationship to the cooperative is that of
investors.  
From a broad perspective, these challenges draw into serious question the character of an
organization as a cooperative or, even more fundamentally, the very definition of a cooperative. 
From the member-patrons’ perspective, such challenges may create conflicting obligations,
motivations, and governance issues that undermine essential rationales for a cooperative’s
existence and farmers’ membership therein.  For purposes of this paper, cooperative
“fundamentals” will be defined as the set of relationships established by generally accepted
cooperative principles.  The analysis is intended as a useful end in itself but also as a contribution
to the factual and analytical foundation required in debates about the identity, character, and
importance of cooperative principles.
Objectives and Overview
This paper has four objectives: (1) Identify obligations that cooperatives have to holders
of outside equity; (2) describe ways such obligations modify or conflict with fundamental
cooperative principles, (3) identify and describe how such obligations modify cooperatives’
objectives, and (4) describe how cooperatives’ “generally expected” behavior toward member-
patrons must be modified to meet obligations to holders of outside equity.
The paper first describes corporate and cooperative fundamental characteristics as
generalized by statements of corporate and cooperative principles.  A small working set of
stylized outside equity situations is described to establish a framework for analysis.  The paper
then explores sources of obligations to holders of such equity and the general character of those
obligations.  The obligations are then applied to cooperative structures and practices to assess
modifications that may be required of cooperatives to respond to the new situation.  Finally,
some implications for the cooperative character of organizations are discussed.
2 Some analysts have generalized an analogous approach as “property rights” analysis. The
3
present approach goes directly to the rights and obligations relevant to the issue.





 A Rights and Obligations Analysis
A direct resort to the rights and obligations established for all involved parties by the
existence and characteristics of financing methods has several advantages.   It focuses on those
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characteristics of relationships that are most likely to define behavior by the cooperative, 
management, and investors.  It facilitates an analytical separation of various interests relevant to
the relationships established.  Similarly, a rights and obligations focus highlights conflicting
interests that are resolved through a combination of negotiated specifications and economic
objectives that are ultimately determined by markets.
The analysis simply takes the rights and obligations established by relevant legal
relationships, identifies the interests affecting those rights and obligations, and assesses the
objectives of each of the interests.  The interplay of rights and obligations for each interest
represented in the relationship establishes the economic motivation for behavior by those
interests, suggests the economically driven strategies applied by all interests, and assesses the
tradeoffs among all parties as they pursue their individual objectives given the rights and
obligations set they have established and to which they are bound.
Outside Equity Described
For purposes of this study, “outside equity” is defined as having two essential
characteristics.  It is equity capital that is not contributed and owned by farmers who either
currently patronize the cooperative or that have patronized the cooperative in the past.  This
eliminates capital that was contributed to the cooperative on a patronage basis at one time but
that has not been redeemed to those who are no longer active cooperative patrons.  Outside
equity is invested by non-member, non-patrons with or without formal rights to participate in the
control of the cooperative by vote or board membership.  Such interests may be transferable by
one holder to another at a privately negotiated price.  The second characteristic is that outside
equity is not invested as part of a patronage relationship but rather has the characteristics of an
investment instrument.  Thus stock issued to the general public but that is also purchased by a
member-patron of the cooperative is considered “outside equity” because the relationship
between the investor and the cooperative is that of investor-corporation, not primarily patron-
cooperative.
Two types of equity demonstrate issues to be addressed.  One is preferred stock and is
treated as equity capital rather than debt capital.   The example preferred stock carries no voting
4 The organization will be called a “cooperative” for purposes of discussion, although arguments
5
may be made that this cannot properly be called a cooperative.  This nomenclature eliminates the need
for excessive, distracting quotation marks around the word cooperative or introduction of some new,
likely confusing, terminology.
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power other than that commonly assigned in corporate change situations (merger, dissolution),
has a set rate of dividend established by terms of the stock ownership, dividends are payable
prior to patronage refund allocation, the stock is callable by the cooperative under specified terms
but stockholders cannot force redemption, and the stock is tradeable without restriction.  A
variant that carries voting rights based on stock ownership may also be considered.
The second type of equity is common stock that carries full rights to vote and participate
in the cooperative  but without preference on dissolution.  Voting is on a share basis, no
5
patronage is required, stockholders do not receive patronage refunds, dividends on the stock are
declared at the option of the cooperative, stock is tradeable, and stockholders cannot force
redemption.  A variation of this example places limits on comparative voting power of holders of
common stock who do not patronize the cooperative.
Stakeholders, Interests, and Objectives
Any person or entity who is in some way affected by the actions of a business entity is
typically called a stakeholder.  Precisely what the stake is in the business entity depends on the
relationships developed.   For purposes of this paper, the focus will be on interests rather than
stakeholders, although the two may coincide.  The difference between stakeholder and interest is
paramount in cooperatives where one stakeholder, a member, for example, possesses multiple
interests with respect to the cooperative entity.  A cooperative member has the interests of a user
(customer), the interests of an investor owner, the interests of one who has the rights and
responsibilities of control, and the interests of one who will receive the benefits of the
organization.  Specific interests may be in direct conflict with each other.  Where interests are in
conflict but possessed by the same stakeholder, the individual stakeholder performs the task of
balancing the interests, yielding decisions about his or her relationship with the cooperative given
the stakeholder’s aggregated set of objectives.  
Where, on the other hand, a singular interest held by one stakeholder conflicts with an
interest of another stakeholder, each with their own objective with respect to that particular
interest, the process of resolving the conflict is quite different.  It is at this point where the role of
specific rights and obligations plays a central role.  The struggle is no longer an internal issue for
a stakeholder that is trying to determine what course of action is best given all of the alternative
paths and the economic or other consequences of each for that stakeholder.  It becomes an
economic process that relies on external relationships, on inter-entity conflicts, on negotiated
resolutions, and on market forces.  Each stakeholder will make decisions based on his or her own
peculiar interests.  The set of actions that can be taken to advance each such interest is defined by
the rights and obligations imposed on the inter-party relationship through which the interests are
recognized and the stakeholders’ actions express themselves. The distinction in views is reflected in differing theories of the firm in economics and law.  The
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latter view fits the theory of the firm as a nexus of contracts (See Baarda (2003), Jensen and Meckling,
Alchian and Demsetz, Cheung, Klein, Hart, and Spence).  The former fits entity, statutory, or production
function theories (See Baarda (2003), Clark, Eisenberg, McChesney, Bebchuk, Coffee, and Kornhauser).
 Corporate characteristics are important for a number of reasons such as Federal income
7
taxation, limited liability, or financing purposes, among many others.  This leads to specialized
formulations that depend on the purpose for which principles are being used.
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The fact that an interest exists, that is, that a stakeholder has one or more interests in the
business entity through some association with that organization, does not define exactly what that
interest is.  More precisely, the fact that an interest exists and is recognized does not define either
why the stakeholder has placed himself or herself in the position of having the interest nor the
objectives of the stakeholder with respect to that interest.  Interests and objectives apply, of
course, to the business entity as well.  The relative positioning of interest, stakeholders, and the
firm itself play out in multiple markets, transactions, and strategies, all given the rights and
obligations to which each player is subject.  The business entity itself may be viewed as an
independent set or as an aggregation of stakeholder interests and objectives.
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Organizational Principles
Every form of business enterprise rests on some set of generally understood principles. 
Cooperatives are no exception.  Interestingly, however, cooperative principles are sometimes
portrayed as unimportant, unworkable, unnecessary, of only academic or philosophical interest,
and in some ways impediments to “effective” farmer-owned organizations.  These debates are
intimately tied into discussions of outside equity, particularly when combined with larger issues
of member control, patron benefit, rapid and deep changes in the agricultural sector, cooperative
limitations, and cooperative survival.  For purposes of this paper, three generally accepted
cooperative principles will be accepted as a statement of cooperative fundamentals.  The issues
then fall into considerations of (1) whether some principles are more important than others, (2)
whether some modification of one principle can be offset by careful adherence to other
principles, and (3) whether the use of outside equity of various kinds has significant impact
(positive or negative) on one or more cooperative principles.
The ultimate subject of this inquiry is the corporate form of business.  Corporate
principles are sometimes listed as are cooperative principles, although not with the focus and
attention devoted to cooperative principles.   While formulations differ widely, a list of seven
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characteristic describes the corporate business enterprise form. (Cox Hazen and O’Neal, p. 6).
1. Shareholders are not personally liable for the obligations of the corporation other
than to the extent they can lose the value of the equity owned.
2. The corporate entity has perpetual existence that does not depend on changes in
the makeup of its shareholders. Cooperatives may have some of the characteristics of close corporations such as limited
8
transferability.  Implications of this are being studied elsewhere.
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3. Corporations have centralized management implemented through the authority
and actions of a board of directors.
4. Shares of stock or other interests in the corporation are generally freely
transferable.  This applies to publically held corporation but less so to close
corporations.  Close corporations restrict ownership and transferability for a
number of reasons primarily through contractual agreements.
8
5. The corporate business has access to debt and equity capital in a great variety of
forms and in many markets.  This capability to garner financing from many
sources is one of the main advantages of the corporate business form and accounts
for the growth of corporations, particularly in the latter part of the 19  century as
th
business enterprise size and financial needs outstripped the capacity of
individuals, families, or small consortia to provide adequate financial resources.
6. The corporate entity has most of the legal rights of an individual.  It acts as a
single unit to hold property, to contract, and to resort to the legal system to
enforce its rights.
7. Many of the relationships among stakeholders are standardized by operation of
corporate statutes giving stability and predictability to corporations, stakeholders,
and those dealing with corporations.  This standardization includes institutional
stockholder and creditor protections.
As in the case of cooperative principles, several formulations of corporate characteristics
are offered as summary descriptions of the corporate entity.  For example, a list of four
(Solomon, et al.) may include:
1. A corporation is a separate entity with perpetual existence.  It exists apart from
those who provide risk capital or who manage its business.
2. Liability for corporate debts is limited to the assets the corporation owns and does
not extend to owners’ assets.
3. The power to manage the corporation’s business is centralized by delegation to
the board of directors.
4. Stockholders can transfer their ownership interests to others without terminating




Given these few fundamental principles, an enormous variety of organizational
characteristics can fit within the corporate fold.  The importance of each principle is largely
dependent on the circumstances that bring the principle into question.  
Cooperative principles are an overlay on corporate principles, with some corporate
principles being directly applicable but with others modified or eliminated by cooperative
principles.  Contemporary formulations of cooperative principles vary, but do not differ
fundamentally from traditional principles.    The most definitive set of principles has been
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developed by USDA. (Dunn).  Modern cooperative principles are:
1. The User-Owner Principle: Those who own and finance the cooperative are those
who use the cooperative.
2. The User-Control Principle: Those who control the cooperative are those who use
the cooperative.
3. The User-Benefits Principle: The cooperative's sole purpose is to provide and
distribute benefits to its users on the basis of their use.
Comparison of corporate principles and cooperative principles leads to several
observations.  For the most part, cooperatives have all of the essential characteristics of a
corporation, the exceptions being unincorporated cooperatives or cooperative organizations using
a limited liability company (LLC) legal form.  Thus, the first five Cox formulation corporate
principles are the same for cooperatives as for cooperatives.  Two distinctions remain.  The first
is that cooperative corporations do not share corporate principles six and seven – corporations
have a broad range of capital sources available to them and interests in the corporation are freely
transferable.  Neither of these differences is total, however.  Cooperative corporations can, in
fact, draw upon a wide range of capital sources in that they can borrow capital from a multitude
of sources and can obtain equity capital from a broad range of individuals and businesses, their
member-patrons.  Sources of equity capital are not as extensive as those available to non-
cooperative corporations, but cooperative corporations can access capital from multiple sources
outside the firm and use it as a single entity, the same characteristic that defines a critical feature
of the modern corporation.  The pool of equity for cooperatives is simply more limited.  This
limitation is the impetus for outside equity.
Transferability carries a somewhat clearer distinction between a cooperative and a non-
cooperative corporation because equity capital in a cooperative is limited to those who have an
additional relationship with the cooperative.  To maintain this requirement, cooperative
membership is typically not transferable, although this is not an unvarying rule.  In any case, the
transferee must meet cooperative requirements such as a patronage relationship with the
cooperative that collects multiple interests in the stakeholder transferee.  To the extent that the This is the basis for contracts, legal theory of contracts, and economic theory of contracts.  For
10
business entities, rights and obligations are either established by multiple contractual relationships (the
nexus of contracts theory of the corporation is adopted) or by the institutionalized entity that defines
rights and obligations, (non-contractarian, corporate entity theories of the firm).
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free transferability of equity in a non-cooperative corporation emphasizes the continued existence
of the corporate body regardless of the precise identity of equity holders, cooperatives, too, carry
this key corporate feature of ownership transferability.
A closer focus on cooperative principles indicates that little direct conflict exists between
non-cooperative corporate principles and cooperative principles.  Some of the essential
organizational and operational characteristics defined in cooperative principles are simply not
addressed in corporate principles as generally summarized.  The user concept, for example, so
essential to cooperative definition, does not appear in corporate principles.  Users have no
relationships to the corporate entity that require special recognition in general principles.  A
second group of relationships, those relating to control, are found in the centralized management
corporate principle, but the actual specification of control through voting power, for example,
comes only in more detailed organizational descriptions by statute and corporate documents.
Corporate principles, at least as summarized above, differ most from cooperative
principles, also as summarized above, in the subject covered by the user-benefits principle. 
Nowhere in the corporate principles is the objective of the corporation specified, unlike the
objective description in cooperative principles.
From Objectives to Obligations
Objectives are inseparably associated with sets of rights and obligations that define
business-oriented relationships.  In most cases a set of relationships defined by rights and
obligations would not be created in the first place unless different stakeholders possessed
objectives that the parties believe would be advanced by entering into relationships.  Once the
relationships are established, the rights and obligations define the parameters by which actions by
all parties lead to collective and individual objectives.
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General Objectives of the Firm
Obligations to various interests by a business entity are derived from the organization’s
objectives.  Where firm objectives define what the business organization must do to satisfy the
objectives of the stakeholders possessing interests in the organization, the firm takes on
obligations to those stakeholder interests.   The corporate entity obtains its objectives in turn
from the character of the organization and from the objectives of the interests represented by the
collection of stakeholders.  In a modern non-cooperative corporate entity, obligations are oriented
nearly exclusively toward the stakeholders who stand in the role of stockholders.
Objectives of the Public Corporation-9-
The objectives of an incorporated business entity, owned by stockholders but an entity
separate from them, are relatively easy to state.  In the last two decades, stockholder value has
become the central legally-mandated objective of corporate firms although the general law and
economics view of corporations has long held that position.  (See Baarda, (2003) and citations
therein).  
Simply defined from a financial point of view, “[t]he objective in corporate finance is
stated, most broadly, as the maximization of firm value and, more narrowly, as the maximization
of the stock price.”  (Damodaran, p. 117).  Several factors are intermediate between the value of
the firm broadly stated and the stock price.  The value of the firm differs from the value of the
firm to its equity holders because a portion of the firm’s value is represented by liabilities.  In
addition, distinctions exist between the value of the firm, however defined, and stock prices. 
Stock price in an efficient equity market is assumed to be a reasonably accurate reflection of the
value of the firm to its owners.  Regardless of views or measures of firm value, firm value is
focused solely on those who ultimately benefit from that value, the owners of shares of stock. 
From a basic microeconomic viewpoint, the standard firm objective is profit
maximization.  This does not necessarily convert to an objective oriented toward maximizing the
value of the firm to its owners, though a rather direct extension of the profit-maximizing
objective would presumably yield that result.  Nevertheless, where a firm is owned by a
collection of stakeholders, profit maximization is a crucial element in the process of converting
profit to firm value to owner value.
When we begin to consider the rights and obligations implicit in a business entity’s
objectives, mere generalizations about what is economically or financial desirable fall short. 
Actual rights and obligations growing directly from objectives must be identified.  The process
begins with statutory and judicial mandates for objectives.  The process continues by identifying
specific situations in which business objectives focus on equity owner value in such a way that
some aspect of the business entity can be forced to meet its obligations to stockholders.  The
interests of that group of stakeholders are recognized as a set of rights.  The other side of the
rights and obligations mirror imposes obligations on the business entity to engage in behavior
that responds to the objectives of stockholder interests.
A general expression of the stockholder value mandate is found in direct statements of
corporate objectives.  This line of defining objectives relates directly to pricing and profitability
decisions by the corporation.  The larger question is whether a corporation is permitted to make
deliberate pricing and operating decisions that do not maximize the value of the corporation to
the stockholders.  A classic statement on mandated corporate objectives and pricing practices
was given by the Michigan Supreme Court in1919.  Henry Ford had decided that the Ford Motor
Company would forgo special dividends to its stockholders for the purpose of reducing the price The same Dodge brothers who subsequently designed automobiles and created the Dodge
11
motor company.
 Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919).
12
 The American Law Institute’s Corporate Governance Project, while focusing on governance
13
issues, addressed corporate objectives after more than a decade of sometimes heated discussions.  The
ALI published the Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations in 1992.
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of automobiles for the public benefit.  The decision was challenged by the Dodge brothers  who
11
owned stock in Ford Motor Company and whose returns on the stock and therefore its value
would decreased because of Ford’s decision.  The Michigan Supreme Court held that the
company could not implement that policy.  The Court said: 
it is not within the lawful powers of the board to shape and conduct the affairs of a
corporation for the merely incidental benefit of shareholders and for the primary
purpose of benefitting others, and no one will contend that, if the avowed purpose
of the [Ford] directors was to sacrifice the interest of shareholders, it would not be
the duty of the courts to interfere.
12
Mandated objectives to maximize the value of a corporation for the benefit of
stockholders is also found in connection with incorporation statutes.  Concerns with the
stockholder benefit only view of corporations led to discussions of the issue in the context of
corporate governance.  What actions can be taken by those charged with governing the affairs of
the corporation that may deviate from the stockholder-benefit objective?  The issue was
addressed by the American Law Institute’s (ALI) corporate governance project of the early
1990s.   ALI stated the overall objective principle and described three exceptions to the
13
stockholder-interests-only rule in §201.
The Objective and Conduct of the Corporation
(a) Subject to the provisions of Subsection (b) ..., a corporation should
have as its objective the conduct of business activities with a view to enhancing
corporate profit and shareholder gain. [emphasis added]
(b) Even if corporate profit and shareholder gain are not thereby enhanced,
the corporation, in the conduct of its business:
(1) Is obliged, to the same extant as a nature person, to act within
the boundaries set by law;
(2) May take into account ethical considerations that are reasonably
regarded as appropriate to the responsible conduct of business; and-11-
(3) May devote a reasonable amount of resources to public welfare,
humanitarian, educational, and philanthropic purposes.
 
Sources of Obligation
The generally stated but specific corporate firm objectives just described lead to rights
and obligations within the business entity and between the business entity and other interests. 
Rights and obligations are the methods by which the objectives are implemented with respect to
distinct interests.
Explicit directives regarding the objectives of a corporation that carry the force of law
bring us one step closer to establishing a set of rights and obligations between owner and firm. 
This paper considers only three conflict resolution situations in which rights and obligations are
developed for corporate entities that (1) further define corporate objectives and (2) implement
those objectives by defining rights and obligations between the corporate entity and its owners. 
The three examples are (1) non-owner constituencies, (2) the “agency problem”, and (3) 
conflicts among equity owners.
The fact that objectives for both cooperative and non-cooperative corporations exist and
are defined in terms of interests outside the firms’s boundaries does not in and of itself define
adequately the obligations in which we are interested.  Obligations should be more carefully
defined than resorting to the statements that a non-cooperative corporation’s mandated objectives
are to maximize its value to equity holders and that a cooperative corporation’s mandated
objectives are to maximize its value to its users.  For purposes of this paper, the focus is on
obligations to outside equity holders.  As noted further below, the assumption is made that the
cooperative’s obligations to outside equity holders are the same as those for outside equity
holders on the part of non-cooperative corporations unless otherwise specified.
The obligations portion of our rights and obligations approach to this issue can be divided
into two general categories.  One category of obligations may be those that carry legal
implications.  Specifically, such an obligation would reflect a right that is legally enforceable. 
That is, if the cooperative did not meet the obligation, the holder of the interest in question would
have resort to the judicial system to either enforce the obligation or obtain damages for the failure
to satisfy the obligation.  Such obligations may be established either by public laws or by the
parties themselves on a contractual basis in private law.
A second type of obligation may be “softer” and not enforceable at law standing alone. 
Nevertheless, because cooperatives as well as other organizations are voluntary in nature, failure
to meet obligations may have a significant impact on the organization regardless of the possibly
unenforceable nature of the obligation.  Moral obligations, obligations based on reasonable
expectations, and those based loosely on underlying economic and legal theory of corporations
are of this type.
The task in addressing obligations is two-fold.  The first is to determine generally the
obligations to investors using general corporate and contractual principles.  The second is to It is important to note that the following discussion is couched in general terms only.  For
14
purposes of this paper a rigorous legal analysis is not conducted.  Such is another project and the
exposition would be very different indeed than the present observations.
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assess the extent to which, if any, the rules apply to a cooperative with outside equity in the same
manner as for a non-cooperative corporation.
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Non-Owner Constituencies
The “non-owner” constituencies issue addresses the situation in which the corporate
entity simply gives away some of its income or assets, thus removing either from the benefit
flowing to owners.  At one time charitable contributions were essentially prohibited because they
were contrary to the mandated objective of the business.  (Cox, pp. 63 - 66).  Although the rules
have changed to allow corporate giving for charitable, a strong theme remains that the donation
of assets be connected to the corporation’s present or prospective welfare.  Sufficient corporate
benefit may be found even if the benefit might be indirect, long-term, or highly conjectural.
A source of considerably more corporate objectives debate involves so-called
“constituency rules.”   Objections developed to the legally mandated single-minded focus on
stockholder value and stock price.  It was clear to most observers that corporate behavior and
strategies aimed solely at maximizing stockholder value could lead to behavior and strategies
detrimental to others who might or might not be generally considered stakeholders.  From an
economic perspective, the stockholder-only rule established that all other interests were
essentially external to the corporate interests.  Some who recognized the problem argued
nevertheless, and still argue, that any modification or expansion of a corporate stockholder-only
objective would (1) undermine the well-being of the organization itself by imposing
uneconomical burdens on the organization, (2) be detrimental to society and the economy as a
whole by interfering with the market-based market system that allocates resources and responds
to consumer needs, and (3) undermine the criteria by which the performance of the corporation
and its management are measured in the financial markets.  Those who believe that the
corporation must recognize and respond to the interests of others in addition to stockholder
interests argue that (1) the rights of stockholders to a maximized value is not inherently superior
to the interests of others in society that may be harmed as a result of the single-minded pursuit of
stockholder value, (2) the size and influence of enormous corporate interests throughout the
world require that societies protect themselves by moderating corporate behavior, and (3) the size
and influence of corporations have grown to the point where they are imbued with a public
character and a public purpose justifying a requirement, or at least permission, to consider
constituencies beyond stockholder value.  (Mitchell)
Constituencies become an issue upon the occurrence of major corporate actions that will
affect those who are not direct stakeholders in the corporation.  The most common example
occurs when a corporation considers a merger or dissolution that will have a negative impact on
employees and the community.  Various versions of constituency statutes say that the corporation
is legally permitted to consider the interest of the employees and community even if a positive See Baarda (2003).  Solutions to the separation of ownership and control problem (Berle and
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Means) engendered several theories of the firm.
Ownership and control issues have directly and indirectly raised a number of issues in
law and economics that have been developed into firm theories.  The most well-known is
the principal-agent model of the corporation in both law (Easterbrook and Fischel,
Brudney) and economics. (Fama, Fama and Jensen, Jensen and Meckling).  Generally,
the principal-agent model has led to two themes in the literature.  One theme is that the
central issue in corporate law and economics is to reduce agency costs by devising
methods to keep those controlling the corporation true to the task of managing the firm
for the benefit of the owners – the stockholders.  A second theme is that the primary goal
of the public corporation should be to maximize shareholders’ wealth.  That principle
leads to the question of relative positions of firm owners and resource owners.
(Greenwood).
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response to their interests would detract from the singular maximization of value for
stockholders.  Other constituency statute versions require such consideration, although no
statutes go so far as to impose a rule for balancing conflicting interests of stockholders with non-
corporate interests.
For purposes of this paper, the teaching of constituency statutes is that absent specific
legal authority of some kind the rule that the corporation is organized solely for the benefit of the
stockholders and the corollary rule that the sole objective of the corporate entity is to maximize
its value to stockholders will both hold.  Constituency statutes frequently specify the objects of
consideration and do not open corporations to behavior for any purpose whatever.  The
obligation of the corporate entity is clear, as are the rights possessed by stockholders to capture
that benefit.
Conflicts Between Management and Owners – The Agency Problem
The agency problem has been a staple of corporate and business firm theory for some
time in economic theory and plays an important role in corporate legal theory as well.  
15
Management behavior detrimental to the interests of stockholders is the subject of much current
concern with corporate conduct, though sometimes not easily separable from the issue of
improper behavior on the part of the corporate entity itself.  In some cases the forum for dispute
resolution is directed at the harm caused directly to stockholders, in others cases directed to harm
caused by the behavior to the value of the corporation, and thus indirectly to the stockholders.
Behavior of the corporation itself toward its stockholders reflecting the mandated
stockholder value maximization objective of the corporation is found also in reorganization
situations such as mergers and consolidations.  In a second typical situation, the behavior of
management is scrutinized to see if management’s actions have caused harm to the value of the
corporation to its stockholders.  Third, the considerable litigation based on Federal securities
laws or state blue sky laws is founded on the rights of stockholders to information from the For example, Dalton v. American Investment Co., 490 A.2d 574 (Del. Ch. 1985), aff’d, 501
16
A.2d 1230 (1985).
 Jedwab v. MGM Grand Hotels, Inc., 509 A.2d 584 (Del. Ch. 1986).
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corporation that will make their decision-making process an informed one on the premise that
stockholders can only realize the value of their ownership interest in the corporation through an
efficient and honest market place.  In all of these situations, the thrust of the rights and
obligations defined in the legal conflict is ultimately the obligation of the corporate entity to
maximize its value to its stockholders in such a way that the stockholders can use the market
place to realize the value of their ownership in the corporation.
Conflicts Among Equity Holders
Internal stockholder conflicts may exist in a corporation having both common stock and
preferred stock.  Stockholder conflicts may also exist in corporations that have only holders of
common stock.  The outside equity hypothesized for purposes of this paper include both.  A brief
discussion of the nature of the obligation to outside equity holders represented by preferred stock
and common stock notes the characteristics of such a conflict.
Certain transactions may pit the interests of the voting common stockholders against
holders of preferred stock.  This may occur whether or not holders of preferred stock have the
right to vote on a particular action such as merger that affects them.
The “hybrid” character of preferred stock between debt and equity has been noted.  An
additional distinction between preferred and common stock exists in the relationship between the
corporation and stockholder.  The corporation-preferred stockholder relationship is often referred
to as “contractual” rather than purely ownership in nature. (Mitchell and Solomon).   A purely
ownership characteristic carries with it a fiduciary obligation on the part of the corporation to
preferred stockholders.  A purely contractual character does not carry such a fiduciary level of
obligation.
A fiduciary relationship may be found between a corporation and holder of preferred
stock although some courts are reluctant to raise the level above that of contractual obligation.  
16
To resolve the problem, some courts have resorted to a split duty assignment.  To the extent that
the issue involves the preference, it is treated as a contractual relationship only.  Where the issue
is one of ownership similar to that of the common stockholders, the fiduciary duty of the
corporation to stockholders applies.   In either case, the corporate entity owes holders of
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preferred stock obligations that are measured at a high level of duty, whether completely
fiduciary or not.  Numerous obligations cannot be ignored simply because holders of preferred
stock may not have a specific right to vote on an issue at hand.
Where a cooperative has members who own common stock but do not have a concurrent
patronage relationship with the cooperative, two distinct interests are created among holders of Assuming no fraud or other impermissible actions that undermine the market process through
18
which stockholders seek relief.
 For a general discussion of close corporations, see Cox, pp. 358 - 394.
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 Cox, p. 393.
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common stock.  For the publically traded corporation, remedies for dissatisfaction with corporate
practices or with the value of the corporation to the stockholder are easy – sale of the stock.   If a
18
portion of common stock representing membership in a cooperative is held by patrons whose
interest is in the benefits the cooperative provides through the use of the cooperative according to
cooperative principles, sale of stock is not simply that of an investor seeking more lucrative
returns on invested capital.  The entire relationship deemed beneficial by the patron comes to an
end.  Conversely, holders of common stock whose only interest is as an investment may be
harmed if actions are taken by patrons, also holders of common stock, undermining the value of
stock.
The situation described is somewhat analogous to the position of minority stockholders in
a close corporation.  A close corporation is commonly characterized by a combination of control,
ownership, and management in a relatively few owners.   In most cases, the relationship is
19
formalized by contractual arrangements on management and control going beyond simple
ownership of common stock.  These relationships along with contractual constraints may result
in a minority stockholder group that has no meaningful way to avoid oppression by the majority
because no ready market for the stock exists.
The relative position of owners in close corporations has been addressed by imposition of
fiduciary duties on those who have the power to make decisions that can harm minority
stockholders.  As stated by Cox:
[M]ost modern courts have accepted the principle that the controlling shareholders
as well as the directors and officers owe a fiduciary duty to other shareholders – to
public shareholders in a publicly held corporation to minority shareholders in a
close corporation.  Some courts have gone further and have held that persons in
control of close corporations owe an especially strict fiduciary duty to minority
shareholders – a duty said to be similar to the duty that partners owe each other
and more stringent than the duty shareholders in a publicly held corporation owe
to each other.
20
Where outside equity is held in the form of preferred stock, the cooperative’s obligation is
defined by the terms of the documents with an overly of some degree of fiduciary duty, although
circumstances may vary the degree somewhat.  Where outside equity is held in the form of
common stock not meaningfully distinguishable from common stock representing membership
by patrons who look to patronage-based benefits from the cooperative, two circumstances create
a special level of obligation.  The most common would be where the outside equity holders are
the minority stockholders in which case the majority (member/patrons) must take care not to-16-
oppress the minority.  The other case would be where the outside equity holders of common
stock are in the majority in which case the member/patrons would be a minority.
Expectations play an important role in determining what actions qualify as oppressive. 
(Cox).  Where actions of a majority lead to a defeat of the “reasonable expectations” of minority
stockholder interest, courts may measure the expectations by objective standards and determine
that such actions are oppressive.  Expectation principles are not uniform and different courts will
apply the rule on a case by case basis.
Privately-Defined Documents
Rights and obligations that define an ownership interest in an entity are largely created by
the entity itself and are described in various documents that the entity produces.  While articles of
incorporation, bylaws, policy statements, board minutes, resolutions, and other documents may
describe relevant rights and obligations, direct review of the document evidencing stock
ownership is most instructive.
Obligations Inferred by Other Relationships
Obligations that are not legally enforceable may nevertheless be potent forces in a
cooperative’s relationship with outside equity stockholders.  While the consequences of not
satisfying such interests’ needs may not subject the cooperative to a legal mandate to do so, the
business, personal, and economics consequences of such behavior may be significant in both the
short run and the long run.  On source of such obligations may be the expectations of
stockholders for compensation for their investment regardless of the cooperative’s legal
obligation to them.  Certain economic principles may underlay obligations to outside equity
holders.  Finally, the cooperative may face a moral obligation to give compensation to outside
equity holders based on the dynamics of the community or the circumstances surrounding the
investment.  While these may be important for some purposes, they are not discussed further.
Application to Cooperative Corporations
The three perspectives of the mandated objective that a corporation maximize the value
of the corporation (and derivatively the market share of the stock) are instructive when
cooperative corporation obligations to outside equity holders are considered.
First, the central objective of the corporation, indeed the same central objective, is
expressed in law, economics, finance, and management.  All require that the corporation focus its
efforts on enhancing the value of the organization for the benefit of those who own it in relation
to their ownership interests.  An obligation is imposed on the corporation to conduct its business
affairs accordingly.  Correspondingly, ownership interests, represented by stockholding, have
rights to expect such activity on the part of the corporation in which they have an ownership
interest.  To some degree, therefore, those rights can be enforced to make the corporate entity
meet its corresponding obligations. Extensive literature on cooperative theory as it may relate to objectives is not reviewed here. 
21
Research is underway to revisit the issue of cooperative objectives.
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Second, deviations from the central objective are permitted, but such deviations are
defined and limited.  For example, the corporation is required to obey business laws applicable to
it even if under some circumstances the value of the corporation to stockholders is diminished
because of that obedience.  The corporation also “may take into account” ethical considerations
appropriate to the responsible conduct of the business.  The more general window of leeway for
deviation from the strictly stockholder value maximization mandate is that of the public interest
or philanthropic purpose.   According to the ALI commentary noted above, a “reasonable
amount” may be devoted to this purpose, presumably amounts that would otherwise enhance the
interests of the stockholders.
The third instructive perspective is that all of the deviations from a mandated owner value
maximization are based on an explicitly public interest.  In none of the “alternatives” to strict
value maximization requirements are other private, competing, or profit-seeking interests
included.  Indeed, in instances where expenditures are made for public or charitable purposes that
in fact represented significant private interests, the stockholder primacy rule trumps the
exception.
A survey of corporate objectives shows that very few interests are involved in the process
of defining corporate objectives.  The corporation’s own objective is quite simple – maximize
value for the shareholders.  The only “outside” interest, that is, an interest not within the
boundaries of the corporate entity because the investors are themselves entities, are the owners
represented by stockholders.  The objectives of those interests is likewise quite straight-forward –
to maximize the returns on their investment.  This for most purposes is one and the same with the
objectives of the corporation.
Cooperative Objectives
Cooperative objectives have been the subject of inquiry for many years and continue to be
of interest for cooperatives given changes in perspectives and fundamental perceptions of
cooperatives.  Cooperative objectives are inherent in much cooperative theory, though not always
explicitly addressed.
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Review of corporate principles reveals no organic statement of corporate objectives.  As
shown in the previous discussion, corporate objectives have been developed derivatively. 
Corporate obligations derived in turn from the objectives are the focus of the development, given
that the objectives discussion is intended to draw rights and obligations into relief for purpose of
this paper.  Unlike general corporate principles, cooperative principles directly and explicitly
address objectives.  In large part cooperative principles are the objectives.  Cooperative
principles can be used as statements of the cooperative corporation’s entity objectives.-18-
The objectives of a cooperative corporation are oriented differently, but in totality are
only somewhat more complicated than those of a non-cooperative corporation.  Cooperative
objectives can be distinguished from non-cooperative corporate objectives in two regards, though
in broad perspective the objective of a cooperative is to maximize its value to a single group of
“outside” interests as well.  It is (1) the identity of this “outside” group and (2) the nature of the
cooperative’s value that define the distinguishing features of a cooperative.  The implementation
of such peculiarly cooperative objectives is reflected in cooperative principles just as corporate
objectives are reflected in corporate principles.
While a comparison of cooperative and non-cooperative corporate objectives is necessary
for purposes of this discussion, a thorough analysis is not.  When a cooperative possesses outside
equity the relationship between the cooperative and investor becomes just that, an investment
relationship.  This relationship then defines the obligations of the cooperative to the outside
investor interests, and the cooperative must behave as a non-cooperative corporation at least with
respect to those interest.  The cooperative takes on some degree of corporate objective to
maximize the corporate entity’s value to investors as investors, as those objectives were outlined
above for corporations.
The fundamental cooperative, non-cooperative distinction is that the cooperative’s
objective is oriented entirely toward user interests rather than entirely toward investor interests. 
This summary, of course, does not reflect the complications of such arrangements which are,
indeed, different than the rubric used to define corporate objectives.  The three cooperative
principles are descriptions of objective implementation.  However the cooperative’s corporate
objectives may differ and however they are defined by cooperative principles, the fundamental
statement of cooperatives’ objective is as simple and as powerful as is the statement of corporate
objectives.  Non-cooperative corporations generate value to their investors as investors –
cooperatives generate value to their users as users.
The second distinction between cooperative and non-cooperative corporations resides in
the identity of the interests to which the two types of entities are responsible.  The interests to
whom the corporate entity owes its objectives are singular – the investor.  In a cooperative, the
user interest to which the cooperative owes its sole allegiance (and existence) is necessarily and
inseparably combined in member entities with the investment interests.  The combination of user
interests and investment interests exist in the same entity – the member – whereas in a non-
cooperative corporation the interests of users are separable and not part of the central corporate
objective.  A similar distinction separates or combines non-investor control in a cooperative
corporation.  Objectives of user interests and investment interests most likely diverge.  In a non-
cooperative corporation, only entities holding investment interests are relevant to corporate
objectives.  In a cooperative corporation, to the contrary, the entities with user interests also have
investment interests.  Any divergence of these two interests is resolved by the entity and the
resultant is conveyed to the cooperative corporate entity by a single stakeholder representing all
interests.  Needless to say, different entities may conduct the internal balance quite differently It should be explicitly recognized that the interests of corporate investors are not homogeneous
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by any means.  Changes in control, takeovers, mergers, consolidations, deadlocks, and dissolutions are
only a few examples of inter-investment, intra-stakeholder interest conflicts leading to major changes in
the corporate entity.
 United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
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and resolutions presented to the cooperative will not be the same for every entity.  This leads to a
decision-making process within the cooperative to balance member/patron interests.
22
Applicability of Corporate Rules to Outside Cooperative Investor Interests
To this point the assumption has generally been made that to the extent that the
cooperative-outside investor relationship is similar to that for corporate-outside investor
relationships, the obligations will be similar for the cooperative corporation as for a non-
cooperative corporation.  Several examples show how outside investment is distinguished from
other investment in a cooperative and emphases the non-cooperative corporate basis for the
cooperative-outside investor relationship.  One such example is the fundamental definition of a
security for purposes of the securities laws.  The purpose here is not to discuss the consequences
of securities law application to a security issued by a cooperative (though it is of critical and
considerable importance when securities laws do indeed apply) but to note the relationships
distinguishing outside equity investment from cooperative-based investment.
The United States Supreme Court considered the problem of membership stock in a
housing cooperative in United Housing  when deciding whether cooperative membership stock
23
is a security for purposes of Federal securities laws.  The Supreme Court decision included four
principles of importance to cooperatives that issue outside equity.  The subject of securities laws
and the protection they are intended to afford investors are based on the existence of equity
markets.  Equity requiring protection is a tradeable commodity the market value of which
determines the value to owners.
The primary purpose of the Acts of 1933 and 1934 was to eliminate serious
abuses in a largely unregulated securities market.  The focus of the Acts is on the
capital market of the enterprise system: the sale of securities to raise capital for
profit-making purposes, the exchanges on which securities are traded, and the
need for regulation to prevent fraud and to protect the interest of investors.
The Supreme Court in United Housing also focused on the “economic realities” of the
transaction, not the name noting that “[b]ecause securities transactions are economic in character
Congress intended the application of these statutes to turn on the economic realities underlying a
transaction, and not on the name appended thereto.”  Quoting from an earlier Supreme Court
case,  the Court said that “in searching for the meaning and scope of the word ‘security’ in the
24 The rules were applied to an agricultural cooperative in B. Rosenberg and Sons, Inc. v. St.
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 Mississippi Valley Portland Cement Co. v. United States, 408 F. 2d 827 (5  Cir. 1969).
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Act[s], form should be disregarded for substance and the emphasis should be on economic
reality.”
Motivations for the purchase of an equity interest in a corporation are of prime
importance in distinguishing an equity interest in a cooperative by member/patrons from an
equity interest in any corporation, cooperative or not, based on a return on investment.  Again
citing previous opinions, the Supreme Court in United Housing said:
This test, in shorthand form, embodies the essential attributes that run through all
of the Court’s decisions defining a security.  The touchstone is the presence of an
investment in a common venture premised on a reasonable expectation of profits
to be derived from the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others.  By profits,
the Court has meant either capital appreciation resulting from the development of
the initial investment ... or a participation in earnings resulting from the use of
investors’ funds... . In such cases the investor is “attracted solely by the prospects
of a return” on his investment. ... By contrast, when a purchaser is motivated by a
desire to use or consume the item purchase ... the securities laws do not apply.
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The lessons from judicial decisions discussing securities and investments for purposes of
this paper are that (1) economic realities determine the relationship between a corporate entity
and its investors, (2) where economic realities determine that the relationship is a corporation-
stockholder one, not an inherently cooperative relationship, the security is subject to market
forces, and (3) the protections needed for investors generally will be applied to investments that
meet the criteria for a market based investment.  The character of an outside investment
instrument issued by a cooperative depends on the economic realities of any corporate-
stockholder relationship.  The economic realities of outside investment in a cooperative are no
different from investment in a non-cooperative corporation.
Miscellaneous judicial and administrative decisions have also emphasized the difference
between a cooperative relationship and a purely corporate-stockholder relationship, though
addressing member/patron issues rather than securities issues.  While the decisions apply only to
the subject matter of the case, general statements enforce the premise that a clear distinction
exists between member/patron investment and outside investment in a cooperative.  Two
miscellaneous examples for tax law are noted more for their language than content.
The 5  Circuit Court of Appeals  discussed a failed attempt to obtain cooperative tax
th 26
treatment for owners of a cement production operation by assigning ownership of the cement to
the firm’s owners.  The Court distinguished clearly between a patronage relationship and a
stockholder relationship.  The district court had held: Revenue Ruling 82-51, 1982-1 C.B. 117.
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There is nothing in the method of doing business by the taxpayer in this case that
distinguishes it from the average or normal corporation doing business for profit,
no matter that the taxpayer is called a cooperative, or that the dividends to
stockholders are referred to as patronage rebates.  Other characteristics of this
taxpayer akin to that of a corporation for profit are that the dividends were payable
only to stockholders of record at the end of each fiscal year, leaving stockholders,
who might have sold their shares prior thereto, with no entitlement to a rebate on
the basis of earnings during the fiscal year; and the fact that, as stipulated, actually
no stockholder used the cement produced. ...
 
It is the opinion of this Court, after carefully scrutinizing the structure of this
taxpayer and its method of doing business, that it was not doing business with its
consumer patrons or assigns in the historical sense of a consumer cooperative, but
that its stockholders are in no different category from that of any corporation
interested in profits, no matter whether the source of that profit be from the
production of cement or any other product, and that accordingly the sums paid
here are not excludible from taxable income.
The Circuit Court said “[w]e have lifted the cooperative veil and have unmasked the
economic realities of these transactions.”  It went on to say:
The only thing these shareholders had in common was an investment in what they
hoped would be a money making venture, and in this respect their relationship to
each other and to the corporation was no different from that of shareholders in any
other publically held corporation.
The IRS applied Mississippi Valley and reached a similar conclusion in a case involving
poultry integrators.   It said:
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The functions performed by the taxpayer are consistent with a
corporation-shareholder relationship but not consistent with a cooperative-patron
relationship.  There is no business or economic reason to sell the chicks to the
member-shareholders other than to try to secure for the member-shareholders the
status of a patron.  The member-shareholders are nonessential links to the outside
and not consumers of the corporate products.  In reality, the taxpayer's method of
doing business is indistinguishable from the normal corporation doing business
for profit, even though the taxpayer calls itself a cooperative.  Any distributions to
the member-shareholders are merely dividends paid to its shareholders.
Outside investment in a cooperative brings with it two significant modifications of the
user-only, value enhancement cooperative objectives.  First, the investment interest is distinct
and separated from all other interests.  It stands with a single objective with respect to the-22-
cooperative, and the cooperative addresses only that interest in its dealings with the investor
entity. Second, the cooperative stands in the same position as a non-cooperative corporate entity
with regard to the investor interest.  Its objectives with respect to the investor become those of a
non-cooperative corporate entity rather than a cooperative entity.  Specifically, to the extent of
the outside investment, the cooperative maximizes its value to the outside investment interest
rather than to its users.
Given this, the obligations of a cooperative corporation to outside equity holders can be
analyzed in terms of the obligations of a non-cooperative corporation.  Obligations to corporate
equity holder, thus to holders of outside equity in a cooperative, revolve around two measures
stockholders use to extract value for their ownership in the corporate entity.  Using total
stockholder returns (TSR) as the central measure of the corporations value to its stockholders
(the value to be maximized as the corporation’s objective), a corporation maximizes its value as
judged by capital markets and maximizes monetary returns to stockholders.  The two are
inseparable with both complimentary and opposing effects.  Specifically, obligations imposed on
a cooperative may include:
1.  A requirement that something be paid as a return on equity to the investors, 
2.  The organization operate in such a manner to generate funding to make such
payments, 
3.  The organization maintain a capital structure that protects the equity-holder
interest, and 
4.  The organization conduct its affairs in such a manner as to enhance the value of
the organization and derivatively the value of stock held by investors.
These four obligations can be used to identify cooperative practices that may require
modification when a cooperative obtains outside equity and the obligations that come with it.
Applications and Implications Considered – A Brief Survey
Implications of the obligations imposed on a cooperative by outside equity can be seen in
five situations roughly associated with cooperative principles.  The five are: Operating and
pricing strategies, allocation and distribution of benefits, financing and strategies, governance,
and secondary implications.  Each of these is deserving of thorough analysis, but only a brief note
on each will suggest the significance of this approach to outside equity and cooperative
fundamentals.
Selected Operating Strategies
The user-benefits cooperative principle provides the first, most comprehensive
framework for discussing applications and implications of outside equity.  The user-benefits
principle entails two processes, though not always clearly separable.  The first is the method used-23-
to generate benefits.  The second is the allocation and distribution of that benefit in whatever
form it takes.  In these processes, particularly in the allocation and distribution process, the
cooperative, non-cooperative corporate distinctions are stark.  The first is discussed by
addressing a selected few operating strategies.  The second is described in the following section
on the distribution of benefits.
The effect that obligations to outside equity holders have on a cooperative’s operating
strategies depend, of course, on the extent of such obligations.  In this section, we consider a few
selected operating strategies that may be affected by obligations to outside equity holders.  The
discussion is necessarily broad each topic is deserving of more detailed economic and business
analysis.  In keeping with the theme of the paper, the general approach is to inquire if obligations
to outside equity holders might modify operating strategies that would otherwise be possible for
cooperatives to meet cooperative objectives.
Pricing and Profitability
Generation of benefits to patrons by a cooperative may include pricing practices that give
a better price to patrons at the expense of overall cooperative firm profitability.  In the extreme, a
cooperative may price so as to cover all costs and expenses but to yield no net margin.  Benefits
are created directly by the pricing practice rather than through generation of net margin with
subsequent allocation to patrons.  To the extent that equity holders are compensated solely from
the disposable income generated by the differential between total revenue and total costs, the
described cooperative pricing practice eliminates the source of funding for compensation to
equity holders.  This same effect is felt by member/patrons, of course, but the benefits of the
pricing practice are obtained directly by the patrons through advantageous prices.
The cooperative’s ability to use this pricing method to generate benefits for patrons may
be restricted by the cooperative’s obligation to outside equity holders.  The cooperative may not
be able to strategically price where the pricing strategies reduce funding sources for outside
equity holders.  This does not mean that the cooperative cannot generate benefits for patrons.  If
the cooperative prices in such a manner as to generate a margin, a portion of that margin can be
allocated and distributed to patrons as a refund after the fact.  The exact portion will depend on
the level of claims that the outside equity holders have on the cooperative’s funds.  However, to
the extent that obligations to outside equity holders require margins for payments to such equity
holders, the cooperative’s pricing strategies are limited.
Profit Maximization and Economic Theory
More generally, the pricing issue is a part of a larger view.  Cooperative theory has
addressed pricing and other practices in various ways.  An optimization strategy is determined
based on the firm’s objectives as a cooperative organization, taking into account its economic
obligations to member/patrons.  The optimization position for a non-cooperative may be quite
different.  To the extent that the cooperative firm is obligated to maintain some modicum of a
non-cooperative corporate optimization on behalf of and because of outside equity holders’
rights, the cooperative’s optimizing behavior must be modified with second best behavior.-24-
A more generalized concept relates to the overall objectives of a cooperative that may go
beyond services that are measurable in strictly economic or accounting terms.  Cooperatives may
have objectives that go well beyond simple profit maximization or even solely economic
activities.  The question then arises whether obligations to outside equity holders restrict those
perhaps unmeasurable objectives because the obligations are based on the economic/accounting
performance of the corporate firm.
Valuation and Value Maintenance
Based on corporate objectives, whether mandated or expected, maximizing the value of a
non-cooperative corporation will differ from maximizing the value of a cooperative corporation. 
The obligation to maintain corporate entity value depends on precisely what gives value.  The
more direct provision of value to equity holders is the receipt of income as a return on their
investment, income generated from the corporation’s operations.  A second and critically
important source of value for corporate stockholders is the market value of the stock.  This value
depends on a number of factors but most importantly for purposes of this analysis on the value of
the corporate entity as an investment.  Net earnings generation levels and stability, retention of
net earnings to increase the entity’s book value, and strategic factors such as growth combine to
determine the value of the corporation as measured by stock value.
Cooperative practices that maximize its value to member/patrons as users of the
cooperative may be limited by obligations that the cooperative has to maintain stock value for
outside equity holders.  To the extent that net margins (generated from business done with of for
the patrons on a patronage based) are distributed to holders of outside equity rather than to
patrons on a patronage basis, the value of the cooperative to its member/patrons is diminished.  A
somewhat more difficult problem is presented where the cooperative organization must not just
share its annual net margins among outside equity holders but must maintain the overall stock
price for the benefit of the outside equity holders.
Scope and Choice of Market Participation
If we assume that the objective of a corporate entity is to engage in activities that
maximize its value, including returns to investors, then the scope of its activities and the choices
of market participation becomes objects of an obligation.  The corporation makes investments
and engages in the kind of business that maximizes stockholder value, business that may change
significantly over time.  In addition, if this basis for obligations to equity holders extends to
cooperatives who have obligations to outside equity holders, cooperative strategies regarding the
scope of their activities and their participation in markets that are contrary to this objective may
be limited.  If that limitation reduces the cooperatives’ objectives to benefit solely its
member/patrons as users, the cooperative is restricted by such obligations.
Free Cash Flows
One of the broader measures of businesses is based on free cash flows.  These are
generally cash flows remaining after specified obligations are satisfied.  Free cash flows to the-25-
firm are cash flows before required payments to compensate for debt capital.  Free cash flows to
equity are cash flows available after compensation to providers of debt capital.  For cooperatives
with outside equity holders, the free cash flow to the outside equity holders requires reduction of
total cash flow by amounts that would otherwise be dedicated to users on the basis of their use. 
The question then is whether the cooperative with outside equity must modify its commitment to
users to provide free cash flow the benefits of which are captured by outside equity holders.
Non-Patronage Source Income
Cooperatives engage in business done with or for patrons as they conduct business on a
cooperative basis.  While this terminology is drawn from Subchapter T of the Internal Revenue
Code, the principle is fundamentally cooperative. It captures the essence of the cooperative user-
benefit principle – the sole purpose of the cooperative is to generate benefit to its users in
proportion to use.  
Cooperatives may also generate income from business that is not conducted with or for
patrons.  When this occurs, the cooperative has several choices about what to do with the net
income generated from that business.  Generally speaking, after taxes are paid on the non-
patronage source income, it is available for the cooperative to use as it sees fit or return it to
patrons on the basis of patronage (but not as a patronage refund).  Importantly, it can be made
available to outside equity holders as dividends on capital stock.  The main issue presented here
is whether the existence of outside equity places any obligations on a cooperative to generate
more non-patronage source income.
Two possibilities for this pressure exist.  First, the non-patronage income may be a source
of funds for returns on equity.  If no non-patronage source income were generated, any payment
to outside equity holders would need to come from income that could otherwise be returned to
patrons on a patronage bases.  Only by engaging in activities that produce non-patronage source
income can the cooperative compensate outside equity holders for their investment without
raiding the funds that would otherwise be available for distribution to patrons on a patronage
basis.
The second pressure to increase non-patronage income business is based on the obligation
of the cooperative to maximize its value to outside equity holders.  Non-patronage income may
be retained by the cooperative as retained net earnings, thus adding to the cooperative’s equity
base.  This practice may be viewed positively by outside equity holders as a hedge against losses
in case of dissolution or bankruptcy.  More generally, as the equity base increases, the
cooperative’s capital structure may be viewed as positive in the capital markets, thus increasing
the market value of stockholders.
Allocation and Distribution of Cooperative Benefits
The user-benefit principle describes distribution of benefits on a patronage bases. 
Margins distributable to those who purchase from or through the cooperative or who sell to or
through the cooperative are allocated to users in proportion to their use of the cooperative. -26-
Equity ownership in the cooperative is not a factor in determining distributions.  To the contrary,
any income allocated to outside equity holders must necessarily be allocated on a basis other than
that of use.  Allocations to holders of outside equity are typically based on the relative amount of
equity held.
Discussion of allocation and distribution cannot be clearly separated from the fact of
benefits generation noted in the previous section.   Four considerations are relevant to the
purposes of this paper.  The complete distinction in allocation methods is quite obvious. 
Distinctions are also seen in the relational structures of cooperative, patron, and outside investor. 
Timing differs in allocation and distribution.  Finally, the variability of benefit generation and
distribution is an important consideration.
Benefits Allocation
Two processes falling within the general concept of allocation relate to obligations to
outside equity holders.  The larger issue is the proportion of benefits that would otherwise be
allocated and distributed entirely to patrons on the basis of their business with the cooperative. 
This is the substance of cooperative operation as expressed in the user-benefits principle.  The
distinctions between cooperative and non-cooperative operation is clear.  To the extent that the
cooperative must make distributions to outside equity holders, the funds so allocated cannot be
allocated to member/patrons and thus are lost to the cooperative’s users.
An associated difference is found in the proportions by which benefits distributions are
made.  For non-cooperative corporations, benefits derived from ownership, whether through the
generation of income in excess of expenses or the increase in market value of stock, are allocated
to owners on the basis of the share of equity owned.  The investor’s decision process essentially
determines how much to invest given the returns obtained based on investment.  For a
cooperative, on the other hand, where benefits are distributed on the basis of business done with
the cooperative, the decision process is quite different.
Objectives differ between the recipients of benefits allocated on the basis of use and the
basis of equity ownership.  Recipients of the benefits based on use – patrons – match their
benefits allocation only with their use of the cooperative.  The only way to receive added benefits
is to increase patronage, a process dependent on many factors not related to investment but on
farming operations, pricing, etc.  Recipients of benefits based on equity ownership on the other
hand can adjust the amount of benefits allocated to them by simply changing their level of
investment in the cooperative, a process wholly dependent on return on investment criteria.
Relational Transactions
The transaction between an outside equity investor and the cooperative is rather limited in
scope and time.  One transaction is, of course, the purchase of the equity interest.  This is a
neutral transaction in the sense that it occurs only once and has a specific, limited affect on both
the cooperative and the investor.  At the end of a fiscal year, the cooperative will provide
whatever compensation is required by the terms of the investment.  The transactions between a-27-
cooperative and its member/patrons is relational not only because the transactions incorporate
and recognize the multiple relationships between cooperative and member/patron but because the
transactions are ongoing over a period of time.  Purchase or sale transactions between
cooperative and member/patrons may occur at multiple times within a fiscal year or over many
years.  In addition, such transactions involve the immediate transaction, later calculation of the
impact the transaction had on the cooperative’s income, allocation of amounts as refunds,
allocation of refunds or per unit retains to equity accounts, and a continuing relationship because
of the equity retained until it is redeemed, also years later.  The neutral and at arms length outside
investor may modify a cooperative’s behavior that was based on traditional relational association.
Timing and Distribution
A cooperative calculates its net margins at the end of the fiscal year and makes distributes
patronage refunds within eight and one-half months after the end of the fiscal year.  The refunds
may be paid in cash or in the form of retained patronage refunds but in either case the distribute
occurs at that time.  With few exceptions, the amount distributed as patronage refunds reflects
the income for the relevant fiscal year and only for that fiscal year.  The recipient patron will
receive benefits related only to that patron’s patronage during the relevant fiscal year.  
In contrast, distributions to outside equity holders will be in the form of dividends on
capital stock and may generally be made at any time.  Flexibility in payment will depend on the
terms of the equity interest.  Variation in corporate profits is not necessarily directly reflected in
correlated payments to equity holders.  Indeed, dividends may be paid even in years in which the
corporate entity suffers a loss.  If the cooperative takes on an obligation to holders of outside
equity that permits this timing difference, the cooperative’s equity may be depleted regardless of
when the equity will be replenished with retained net earnings.
Fixed or Variable Funds Flows
The fixed or variable funds flows problem is related to the timing and distribution
problem but identifies an additional issue with outside equity investment.  Funds flowing into
and out of the cooperative will vary from year to year.  To the extent that outflows are in the form
of patronage returns, those outflows will depend on the amount of margins available each fiscal
year.  If no net margins are generated, the cooperative will have no outflows because no
patronage refunds will be made.  Obligations to patrons whose relationship with the cooperative
is based on cooperative principles will be limited to cooperative net margins and will not force
the cooperative to deplete its funds or capital in years in which net margins are nil or diminished.
Obligations to outside equity holders may not be so limited.  To the extent that the
obligation requires the cooperative to compensate outside equity holders regardless of current or
past profits, the outflow of funds is fixed.  In almost all cases, the outflow to equity holders is
“more fixed” than outflows based solely on patronage refunds paid out of net margins.  The
result of this difference is an increase in net margin fluctuation brought about by the change in
leverage, where leverage is defined in terms of obligatory payments versus payments required
only from margins are generated.   The relevant capital market is not necessarily an organized market, nor is it necessarily an
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active one.  It is any forum through which the equity is sold by the cooperative and traded by the equity
holder.
-28-
Financing Practices and Strategies
Outside equity has its primary effect on a cooperative’s financial structure.  It adds a new
element to the owners’ equity portion of the balance sheet and a new requirement for
compensation for capital.  Several distinctions from member/patron equity and from capital
generally contributed to the cooperative through membership and patronage relationships are
noted briefly here.
Decoupling
Cooperative equity is based primarily, usually exclusively, on the patronage relationship. 
Additions to capital from membership fees, retained patronage refunds, and per unit retains make
up the bulk of cooperative equity capital, and unallocated reserves are also generated by
cooperative business though not usually business done with or for patrons.  In every case, the
addition of equity capital depends on the cooperative’s operation.  Obligations to holders of
cooperative equity likewise is integrally associated with the patronage relationship, from return
based on use rather than level of equity ownership to the cycle of investment and disinvestment
similarly based on the patronage relationship.
Outside equity is decoupled from the member/patron relationship.  It is not added by any
relationship with the patronage process nor are the obligations to equity holders for compensation
or redemption based on the patronage process.  Nor is it added because of what the cooperative
does with the funds on behalf of the equity holder.  Obligations to the outside equity holders are
not associated with a patronage relationship unlike cooperative obligations to member/patrons.
The cooperative must venture into new arenas to obtain outside equity because of this
decoupling.  Relationships and transactions necessarily a part of obtaining outside equity will
require of the cooperative that it take on a set of obligations entirely different from those
associated with member/patron equity.  These obligations are based not on internal factors but on
the capital market practices and forces.   In return for obtaining the investment, the cooperative
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creates obligations to the investors.
Costs of Capital
Cooperatives costs of capital have been a difficult subject for cooperatives because of the
multiple relationships of the investor as member/user and because benefits are not distributed
directly on equity ownership but through the patronage relationship.  Returns made to equity
holders required by them as a condition for their investment are not in a one-to-one relationship
with ownership but with use.  Outside equity changes this in several ways.-29-
Costs of capital may be direct or indirect.  Indirect costs of obtaining outside equity may
include the diminution of the strength of cooperative principles, limitations on strategies and
practices in which the cooperative may otherwise engage noted above, or impositions of new
governance burdens and requirements as noted below.  Direct cost of the outside equity capital is
generally the monetary outlay required to compensate investors.  Intermediary costs are those that
diminish the value of the cooperative for its member/patrons because it may not maximize its
value to them as member/patrons given restraints associated with its obligations to outside
investors.  All these factors influence the total cost of outside equity in the cooperative.  Their
measure is unfamiliar to cooperatives with no outside equity.  Outside equity creates a
requirement that the various facets of obligation with direct and indirect implications for costs be
measured.  Such is not an easy task but incorrect conclusions can be seriously harmful to the
financial condition of the cooperative.
Leverage
One form of leverage with outside equity may place member/patrons in a
disadvantageous position.  As one example, where half of a cooperative’s equity is provided by
preferred stock, the risks to members of being junior to the preferred stock is increased.  The
cooperative’s obligation to outside equity holders to give them priority upon the occurrence of
certain events comes at the expense of member/patron equity holders.  Similarly, where the
cooperative is obligated to make either sum certain payments or payments is require before
distribution to member/patrons, fluctuations in the income generated by the cooperative will be
multiplied.
Objectives
Turning to the objectives of interests in the cooperative, differences between
member/patrons holders of equity and the holders of outside equity are clear.  The objective of an
outside investor is to obtain returns on the equity that justify investment given opportunities for
alternative investments.  The objective of member/patrons who invest in a cooperative is to
obtain the benefits of the cooperative in the multiplicity of methods cooperatives have to
generate and distribute benefits.  Outside investment is made for the purpose of obtaining income
from the investment, while member/patrons invest to generate income in their farming operation. 
Outside investment is associated with the savings sector whereas member/patron investment is
part of the production sector.
The character of the obligations to outside equity holders and to member/patrons reflect
the different objectives.  One of the issues raised by the presence of outside equity is whether
member/patron investors are encouraged to adopt the objectives associated with outside
investment.   If this occurs, the nature of obligations to member/patrons may change to look more
like obligations to outside investors.  At this point the cooperative will face a significant
reevaluation of the character of a cooperative, principles that define a cooperative, and the
totality of the rights and obligations that make the cooperative a business enterprise.  From
another perspective, if member/patrons are already viewing their equity investment in a
cooperative from an investor’s perspective with required returns on equity and liquidity, the-30-
rights and obligations set within the cooperative will differ little from that directed to outside
investment.
Valuation – From Member/Patrons to Markets
Valuing a firm is a central problem in finance.  The ultimate value of a corporation is
measured primarily by the value of the equity ownership in a market, whether that market is a
public market or a private transaction.  The focus of a cooperative on the other hand is the value
it provides member/patrons through the patronage relationship.   Starting with the proposition
that the objective of the corporation is to maximize value, obligations based on those objectives
are transferred from obligations to maximize the patronage benefits for member/patrons on the
part of cooperatives to maximizing the market price of the equity held by outside equity holders. 
Perceptions of value are moved from an entirely internal forum based on complex
interrelationships to a market forum based on the market value of the equity.  Not only is the
valuation different, those who determine value are different.  It may also be expected that those
who determine value from the perspective of the market place may not fully understand the
internal dynamics of the cooperative being judged, or even its fundamental character.
Benefits Bias
Equity (and other capital) is obtained by business firms and is invested in assets that yield
returns greater than the cost of capital.  Cooperatives are no exception, though as noted the cost
of capital is not as determinable as non-cooperative corporate equity.  Returns to member/patrons
justifying their equity investment in the cooperative are not based directly on equity but on
several other factors.  Nevertheless, if total benefits are not sufficient to justify equity
investments, entities will not be cooperative member/patrons.
Outside equity would likewise be expected to generate income to the cooperative in
excess of its costs, the excess providing the advantage to the cooperative of the outside
investment.  Total benefits to the cooperative will be divided between compensation to holders of
outside equity and to member/patrons as users.  The question then arises about the relative
distribution of benefits that are generated by the addition of outside equity to the cooperative’s
capital structure.  A bias will exist if the benefits generated by the outside equity are captured by
the outside equity holders disproportionately to total benefits generated by all equity capital. 
Theoretical and empirical investigations are necessary to provide an answer to the question but
the cooperative’s obligations to outside equity holders will determine the rules to be applied and
consequently on any biases in the process.
Governance
The argument is sometimes made that so long as farmer members maintain at least a
majority of the votes in a cooperative, the cooperative control principle is met and other
principles become less important.  This proposition may be questionable for several reasons. 
Obligations to outside equity holders may modify the normal control expected in a cooperative
setting, perhaps significantly.  The term “governance” encompasses a broad spectrum of-31-
decision-making processes in a cooperative from long-range and strategic planning to specific
implementation and operation practices.  Governance is far more than just voting for a board of
directors.
Voting Power and Cooperative Control
The governance issue and outside equity can be divided into parts.  The first question is
whether holders of outside equity have formal rights to vote in the affairs of the cooperative. 
This is further divided into the specific situations in which outside equity holders may vote
whether in the ordinary affairs of the cooperative or only on some event such as merger,
consolidation, dissolution, or perhaps sale of all assets.  Voting on special events may be a
statutory requirement even where the investment agreement gives no rights to vote.
The second and more difficult aspect of outside equity holders and cooperative control
occurs when the outside equity holders have no right to vote in the affairs of the organization but
the cooperative’s obligation to such equity holders limits the range of decisions the cooperative
can make.  This constraint on the full set of decisions is an effective control feature imposed on
the cooperative and thus becomes part and parcel of the cooperative’s governance process.
A further distinction is found in the source of voting power and the ability of equity
holders to adjust their relative voting power.  Voting power for cooperative member/patrons is
typically limited to either one vote per member or some voting power based on patronage. 
Equity ownership is not a factor in voting power and member/patrons have limited ability to
adjust equity ownership proportions that have any impact on voting power.  For voting based on
outside equity ownership, however, the non-cooperative corporate rule is that voting is based on
equity ownership.  To the extent this is true for holders of outside equity in a cooperative, the
equity owners may gain voting power in the cooperative simply by purchasing more equity.  Of
course, such voting power is unrelated to the use of the cooperative.
The result of applicable voting rules along with limitations on some aspects of the
cooperative’s decision-making process, including the range of decisions that can be made, shows
that numerical voting power is not the same as the concept of control inherent in the user-control
cooperative principle.  Governance issues extend beyond measured voting power and relative
control by those with a right to vote.  The touchstone of voting is selection of boards of directors. 
Boards of directors will confront the issue directly in the range of decision they can make in the
affairs of the cooperative.  To the extent that obligations to outside equity holders affect what a
cooperative can or must do in a myriad of situations, board of directors will be required to
consider such factors and make decisions on behalf of the cooperative accordingly.
Levels of Obligation
The presence of outside equity holders whose interests diverge from the interests of
member/patrons will place a duty on the board of directors to take such interests into account. 
This has been couched in terms of obligations running from the cooperative to holders of outside
equity.  In practice, the board of directors is required to consider cooperative obligations in the-32-
decisions it makes about the cooperative’s performance and strategies for future actions.  Thus
the board of directors is faced with an added constituency carrying rights that the cooperative
must recognize.  The fiduciary relationships within a cooperative have been modified, and the
cooperative as an entity and board of directors specifically will need to reconsider fiduciary
relationships to include another set of participants.
Constraints on Cooperative Decisions
A number of constraints and requirements have been outlined with the addition of outside
equity ownership.  The full range of constraints and obligations will limit and form cooperative
decisions.  This may range from short-term pricing practices to decisions about business
strategies to long-term goals, some of which are noted above.  The consequence is that effective
control is limited by constraints regardless of formal voting rights.  When obligations to conduct
business in certain ways limit the usual full range of options, cooperative control is limited.  This
is not to say that the cooperative operates at the whim of others.  The obligations were accepted
in the first place by the cooperative so any resulting constraints are also within the cooperative’s
control.  The cautionary tale is that the many implications of incurring such obligations to obtain
outside equity must be fully understood and appreciated as part of the initial decision-making
process.
Measuring Performance
Cooperative performance is often somewhat problematic in the best of circumstances
given cooperative objectives that focus on users.  The meaning of the bottom line at the end of a
fiscal year, tradeoffs between profit and pricing benefits to patrons, the satisfaction levels of
member/patrons, adjustment of services whether added or deleted, growth or contraction,
financial ratios, and many other factors enter into measuring a cooperative’s performance. 
Obligations to outside equity holders will to some degree change measures of performance.  The
cooperative will need to incorporate into the performance measures such items as its payment to
outside equity holders, generation of funds to make such payments, capital structure satisfying
the interests of equity holders in the investment value of the cooperative, and the impact of its
performance for the year on the stock prices of outside equity holders.  Failure to meet
obligations to outside equity holders is detrimental to the cooperative regardless of the seeming
excellent performance as performance is measured solely by member/patrons.
From Member/Patrons to Capital Markets
Governance and decision-making processes in a cooperative whose users, owners, and
beneficiaries are the same stakeholders representing the same sets of interests are essentially
internal.  Both the character of cooperation and the corporate nature of the cooperative
corporation keep decisions, objectives, and tradeoffs “within the firm.”  Divergent interests and
objectives and the resultant cooperative policies and strategies are part of a process whose
decisions are kept within the cooperative.  The forces are all based on member/patron interests
and obligations.-33-
Outside equity interests are not member/patron interests when the equity is a traded
commodity.  The value of the equity is determined not by member/patrons who use the
cooperative but by capital market forces.  To the extent that the cooperative has an obligation to
holders of outside equity to maximize the value of the cooperative and enhance the market value
of the equity, the cooperative is judged not by its member/patrons but by those outside the
cooperative.  The value of the cooperative is judged in a different arena for different purposes.
For governance purposes, this phenomenon requires that the cooperative, particularly its
management and board of directors, look outside of the cooperative and its member/patrons to
determine how well it is meeting its obligations to outside equity holders and, even more
challenging, how the cooperative must act to satisfy the participants in a entirely different market
place.  Both of these functions may strain the abilities of a board of directors whose fundamental
purpose is the operate the cooperative for the benefit of member/patrons as users of the
cooperative.
Secondary Issues
The above issues lead to several observations about the broader impact of outside equity
in a cooperative.  These go beyond the rights and obligations focus of the paper and are offered
as ideas to consider for future inquiry.
Local Benefits
Cooperatives are frequently said to have a peculiar benefit to the community or region in
which they exist because the income or other benefits stay in the community or region.  In some
cases it is possible that no business would exist in the community were it not for the intent of the
cooperative to locate locality.  Even if an business existed in the community, if the same business
were carried out by a cooperative the argument is made that business profits will stay in the
community in the case of a cooperative and not the non-cooperative.  For a non-cooperative the
profit will be benefit investors wherever they are located.  Benefits generated by the business in
the form of profits will leave the community.  The same argument may be made in the case of a
cooperative with outside equity holders.  Benefits captured by the equity holders are not
necessarily connected with the community in which the cooperative exists.  The extent to which
this occurs depends on many factors, of course.  Outside investors may indeed be part of the
community, and the profits may not be distributed but may be retained in the business to further
enhance its profitability and growth.  Although the general argument is true and appealing,
specific facts determine the consequences of outside equity on the local community.
Consumption Functions
Multiplier effects of a business depend in part on the use made of business profits.  The
benefits of a cooperative whose members are producers become part of the producers income and
thus the production process.  The added income facilitates continued production or growth and
adds to the production economy.  Income to investors, on the other hand, is added to the savings
sector as a return on investment.  It may well be that the funds in the savings sector will find their-34-
way back into equity in another business, thus facilitating its continued operation and growth. 
That step, however, does not have as direct an impact on production, particularly at the local
level, as does cooperative returns to users based on use.  Theoretical and empirical investigation
may shed light on this possibility.
Cooperative Roles
Cooperatives have traditionally been perceived to play important roles in the economy
beyond merely marketing and purchasing on behalf of their own producer members. 
Cooperatives correct market failures, increase the efficiency of markets by adding effective
competition, and according to Nourse establish a competitive yardstick by which other
businesses can be measured.  Such benefits presume certain types of behavior and performance
on the part of cooperatives.
The presence of outside equity in a cooperative would not be expected to make a
considerable difference in the roles cooperatives play.  However, an inquiry may identify several
concerns.  In broad terms, one example may be demonstrated where a cooperative is expected to
provide a competitive yardstick function in a poorly functioning market by lowering prices for a
farm input.  According to the competitive yardstick rule, the lower prices would force
competitors to lower their prices as well.  The price change would squeeze excess profit from
competitors.  If, however, a cooperative’s obligations to outside equity holders prevented the
described pricing practice, the cooperative would not play its competitive yardstick role in the
economy.  While this is an extreme example, nevertheless unexpected implications of outside
equity in a cooperative may be found.
Trickle Down
A cooperative’s sole focus is on providing the maximum benefit to its member/patrons. 
To the extent that obligations to outside investors cause the cooperative to deviate from that
single purpose, member/patrons are disadvantaged.  The extent to which the user-benefit
principle is compromised is a matter of degree.  The concern with significant amounts of outside
investment, especially when accompanied by significant control shifts, is that the farmer
members will get what is left after the primary outside investors are duly compensated under
whatever terms between cooperative and investors have been agreed upon.  The will again be
mere price takers in the market.
The concern is raised by some of the more forceful arguments for the need for outside
equity investment.  The argument is that unless outside investment is obtained, farmers will have
no way to participate in value-added business and will have no means by which to capture profits
of the value-added business.  Only if farmers accept significant outside capital can they
participate in a profitable enterprise.  At some point the value-added business is essentially
investor-driven.  The argument may still be made that the farmers are receiving at least
something that they would otherwise not otherwise receive.  However, they are left essentially
with only what remains after profits have been largely distributed elsewhere contrary to the
central premise of the cooperative enterprise.-35-
Conclusions
The methodology used was that of a survey of concepts.  Obligations that a cooperative
may incur when it adds equity from non-member, non-patrons to its capital structure were
assessed by analogy, not with a complete legal analysis.  
Corporate objectives are directed to the maximization of value for stockholders.  To the
extent that a cooperative corporation has outside equity, its obligations follow those for non-
cooperative corporations for the holders of the outside equity.  Such obligations may require the
cooperative to operate in a manner different that it would without such equity.  Required changes
may go beyond compensating outside equity holders for their equity in the cooperative.
The paper shows that obligations to holders of outside equity (1) are significant in a wide
range of circumstances, (2) often are not recognized, and (3) reach beyond obligations that can be
readily discovered by assessing formal voting rights for holders of outside equity.  The survey
also finds that newly acquired obligations to holders of outside equity modify every cooperative
principle to some degree, though the precise point at which a cooperative loses its essentially
cooperative character is not necessarily evident.  Arguments that an organization maintains
essential cooperative features so long as farmer members have majority voting rights in the
organization are not supported when the relative position of farmers – the defining goal of
cooperation – is assessed.  Obligations are found to have multiple impacts on firm and member
objectives.  Costs of outside capital, both explicit and implicit, cannot be properly measured
without careful analysis, presenting a situation that may lead to serious post hoc internal conflicts
in objectives, expectations, and governance.
The precise implication of obligations is fact sensitive.  Further detailed research is
required to answer specific questions about the impact of outside equity on a cooperative.-36-
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